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Social Injustice in Minor League Baseball:
How Major League Baseball Makes Use of
an Antitrust Exemption to Exploit its
Employees
Gregg Steinman*
“[It is] very much like the indentured servitude of the 1700‟s.
When you first sign, you are owned by that team for basically 7
seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to another
country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you if you
get hurt. A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for
someone else. He can [not] try out for his home team. You have
to play for the team that drafted you even if they are loaded at
your position. . . [T]his obsession with making the majors should
not be a justification for the current treatment of minor league
players, and I certainly hope it would not be used as an excuse to
give major league and minor league owners a legal blank
check.”1
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INTRODUCTION
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution bars any law
from impairing the obligations of contracts.2 There are minimal
restraints, including minimum wage, antidiscrimination, antitrust, and
competition laws, to this freedom of contract guaranteed by the
constitution. However, Major League Baseball (―MLB‖) by availing
itself of a century-old antitrust exemption has continuously found a way
to circumvent even these restraints and create one of the biggest
monopolies this country has ever seen.
In the last twenty to thirty years, the industry of professional sports
has become one of the biggest businesses in the world. In so doing, the
commissioners of the leagues into which most sports are organized have
had to become savvy businessmen with one ultimate goal: to maximize
profits. The simplest way for professional sports to maximize profits is to
decrease the supply of the product, while at the same time increasing the
demand for it. MLB has done a sensational job of this. Throughout the
last century, reaching the majors has become the ultimate goal of any
baseball player with little to no competition from opposing leagues.
MLB has become the American dream, so to speak, for any young
ballplayer: if you work hard enough you can make millions of dollars by
simply playing baseball. But while this is true for some, it is not the case

2

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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for most players. Exploiting this pipe dream, MLB has been able to all
but eliminate freedom of contract between the league and its players.
This note will study how MLB‘s antitrust exemption has allowed
MLB to violate federal laws and exploit its employees. First, in Part I,
this note will examine the history of MLB‘s antitrust exemption, the
history of MLB‘s rules and bylaws, and how this groundwork affects the
payment of Minor League Baseball (―MiLB‖) players. In Part II, this
note will assess the reasons why the antitrust exemption should be lifted
through an analysis of how the business of baseball has changed since
the granting of the exemption. Part II will then test whether MLB would
be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act if the exemption were to be
lifted. Finally, Part II will conclude with a counter argument in favor of
maintaining the exemption.
Next, Part III of this note will provide some of the larger issues that
have followed since the granting of the exemption, explaining how MLB
has, over time, used the antitrust exemption to create a closed market as
well as violate federal minimum wage and overtime laws. Part III will
conclude with the effects that MLB‘s exemption has on its incoming
employees. Part IV of this note will compare the National Collegiate
Athletics Association (―NCAA‖) to MiLB in light of O‟Bannon v.
NCAA3 and discuss how the court‘s analysis can be applied to MLB.
Finally, Part V will provide a plausible solution that could potentially be
used by MiLB players to combat MLB‘s rules and restrictions, and
conclude with an overall recap followed by what needs to be done to fix
the problem.

I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In 2014, Miami Marlins outfielder Giancarlo Stanton (―Stanton‖)
signed a thirteen-year contract worth $325 million, currently the largest
contract in professional sports history.4 However, Stanton had to start
where all other players start, in MiLB. Like Stanton, each player selected
in the draft is forced to work over sixty to seventy hours per week for the
five-month season5 and over forty hours per week in the offseason, while
3

O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Bob Nightengale, Marlins, Giancarlo Stanton Finalize 13-Year, $325 Million Deal,
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2014) http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/11/14/
giancarlo-stanton-marlins-contract-extension/19040675/.
5
Second Amended Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour
Laws at 35-36, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-00608JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014)[hereinafter Complaint]
During the roughly five-month championship season, minor league
teams play games either six or seven days per week . . . minor
4
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only earning preset yearly salaries.6 The players that eventually make it
to the Major League level are paid substantially, with contracts ranging
from six to as many as nine figures, while those who remain in MiLB,
ranging from Single A to Triple A, make an average of four figures.7
These salaries force players and their families to live in very harsh
and meager conditions.8 MLB exploits these players by claiming that it is
giving them the opportunity to make money playing a sport they love,
and by glorifying the success stories of the small percentage of players
who work up through the minor league system to a big pay day.
However, the 6,000 other players that do not make it to MLB continue to
fuel this beast. How do the owners get away with it? They do so by
claiming that the players are developing in the minor league system and
that they will make it to the majors once they have become talented
enough. But the rules that MLB has implemented force these players to
play for very little while they are under contract for approximately seven
years; thus, MLB essentially leaves them stranded in the minor leagues
without the ability to negotiate or even voluntarily leave.9 If they do
leave, they are not allowed to play for any other team in MLB nor for
any other professional domestic or foreign franchise.10

leaguers must participate in mandatory pregame activities . . . with
games averaging around three hours in length, minor leaguers usually
work around eight mandatory hours at the stadium on these days . . .
As part of the maintenance of first-class conditioning required . . .
players must also regularly perform strength and conditioning
workout during the season . . . Additionally, minor leaguers are
required to perform protracted travel, usually by a team bus . . . bus
rides each lasting several hours . . . The minor leaguer arrives to the
home stadium before beginning the trip; packs belongings . . . loads
the bus . . . The minor leaguer performs a similar process at the
beginning and end of each trip.
Id. at 35 (omissions from original in quoted text).
6
See generally id. at 29-33.
7
Complaint, supra note 5, at 33. It is important to note that players selected in the
first few rounds of the draft receive high signing bonuses; however, these numbers
become skewed as the players selected in the later rounds receive very minimal pay.
8
See id. at 61 (―Because of these salaries, Mr. Ortiz struggled to live. He often lived
with host families during the season, but when host families were not available he had to
ask his mom for assistance to help pay for an apartment.‖); see also id. at 62 (―Because of
these salaries, Mr. Jimenez struggled to live. At one point during the season, he and
several teammates crammed six players into a 2-bedroom apartment to save on rent.‖);
see also id. at 63 (―Because of these salaries, Mr. Watts struggled to live . . . he lived with
many guys crammed into a small apartment. He often slept on a cheap air mattress during
the season.‖) (omission from original in quoted text).
9
Id. at 29.
10
Id. (Players that voluntarily leave are ―subject to the discipline of the
Commissioner‖).
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To fully understand how MLB has not been punished for creating
these arrangements, it is important to analyze its rules and history. In the
1920‘s, MLB created a ―farm system‖ to develop players.11 In 1962, the
league implemented a Player Development Plan, which required each
MLB franchise to maintain a certain number of minor league teams. 12 In
today‘s league, each franchise has roughly forty players on its major
league roster and approximately 150-250 players in its ―farm system,‖
generally consisting of four to five teams.13 This means that among the
thirty teams in MLB, at any given time, it is employing around 6,000
minor league players.14 1965 marked the creation of the Rule 4 Draft,15
which mandates that all amateur players from the United States, Canada,
and Puerto Rico participate in the draft in order to sign with a team. 16
The players in this draft are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two
(with some being twenty-three), and once selected, they become the
exclusive property of the drafting team without any ability to bargain
with another.17

A. Major League Baseball Rules
The rules of MLB have been formed in a way which preclude
freedom of contract. MLB has constantly suppressed signing bonuses to
players due to oversight from the Commissioner of Baseball.18 In the late
90‘s the commissioner effected a ―slotting system‖ that recommends
signing bonuses for high picks in the draft.19 Furthermore, if a franchise
wishes to exceed the recommended slot level, it must receive permission
from the commissioner‘s office directly,20 which is unlikely. In 2012,
current commissioner Bud Selig employed an even stricter system that
places caps on the total amount a franchise can devote to these bonuses.21
Around this time, Selig also imposed a bonus pool for Latin players in
order to restrict signing bonuses for individual Latin players.22 Teams are
allowed a certain number of signings up to a total amount, for Latin

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Complaint, supra note 5, at 25.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Complaint, supra note 5, at 27.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Complaint, supra note 5, at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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players, which do not count against the teams allotted pools for players
drafted.23
MLB has also implemented a Uniform Player Contract (―UPC‖) that
must be used by all franchises and approved by the commissioner
directly.24 The UPC has removed all negotiating power by athletes that
are drafted or signed outside of the draft because by not signing the UPC
they will be forbidden from signing with another team.25 The
requirements set by the UPC are that the franchise owns the player‘s
rights for seven years and only the drafting franchise can deal the
player‘s rights to another team.26 Not only can the player not sign with
another team, but also upon signing the UPC, a player signs away his
rights to play for another team outside or within MLB or the United
States.27 Even those who want to retire during their seven-year term must
receive commissioner approval under the UPC.28
The rules also provide what the player‘s payments will be and
restrictions on these payments. Major League Rule 3(c) provides a
requirement that all first-year minor leaguers earn an amount established
by MLB, currently around $1,100 per month, but these numbers are not
made public so this is purely an estimate.29 The current salaries
23

See Ben Badler, MLB Slashes Money for International Players While Draft Bonus
Pools Rise, BASEBALL AMERICA (April 14, 2014) http://www.baseballamerica.com/
international/mlb-slashes-money-for-international-players-while-draft-bonus-pools-rise/.
While the bonus pools for draft picks slightly increased for 2014, the
amount that teams can spend on international players before facing
taxes and other penalties has decreased for the third straight year.
Technically, the aggregate bonus pools for international players rose
by 1.2 percent, moving from $78,226,600 to $79,194,000. In reality,
the amount that teams will be able to spend on international players is
decreasing for the third straight year. That [is] because, for the first
two years of the international bonus pools, teams were allowed six
signings of up to $50,000 that would not count against their pools,
giving each team an extra $300,000 beyond their pool space and $9
million for the industry as a whole. When the 2014-15 international
signing period begins on July 2, per the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, those $50,000 exemptions disappear. It [is] a clever
accounting trick, one where Major League Baseball can claim that
the international bonus pools are up a nominal amount from the
previous year, when really the bar is being lowered. The reduction for
international players comes while MLB has simultaneously raised the
amount teams can spend on the draft before facing penalties for the
last three years.
24
Complaint, supra note 5, at 28-29.
25
Complaint, supra note 5, at 29.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 29-30.
29
Id. at 31.
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―recommended‖ by MLB to be paid during a championship season are as
follows: $1,100 per month for Rookie and Short-Season A, $1,250 per
month for Class-A, $1,500 per month for Class-AA, and $2,150 per
month for Class-AAA,30 with Rookie being the lowest level and ClassAAA being the highest level of MiLB. It is important to note that these
salaries are only paid during the five-month season, not the twelvemonth calendar year. Thus, it is estimated that most minor league players
earn less than $7,500 per year, with some earning $3,000 or less.31
Although the UPC allows players to negotiate for more money after the
first year, there is a provision that states that if the franchise and player
cannot agree to a salary, the franchise can simply set one and the player
is forced to agree.32
The UPC also requires players to ―perform professional services on a
calendar year basis,‖ even though they are only paid during the fivemonth championship playing season.33 Furthermore, there are required
playing times for the players during the year when they will not be
paid.34 Lastly, they are subject to fines if they do not stay conditioned
throughout the calendar year.35
MLB justifies these off-season requirements by claiming that they
are to further hone the player‘s skills.36 However, the time-consuming
requirements and lack of professional skills in other fields of work leave
players at a severe disadvantage. They often work minimum wage jobs in
the off-season that leave them no better off financially than during their
paid baseball seasons.37
30

Id. at 32.
Complaint, supra note 5, at 33-34
32
Complaint, supra note 5, at 32.
33
Id. at 33.
34
Id. at 33-34. (The UPC ―requires the minor leaguer to participate in spring
training . . . [and] does not allow for salaries during this period since spring training falls
outside the championship season . . . Around 30-50 minor leaguers per MLB Franchise
do not earn a roster spot on a minor league team at the end of spring; they instead remain
at the Franchise‘s spring training site . . . Since they are not participating in a
championship season, MLB‘s UPC again does not require salaries to be paid . . . At the
end of the championship season, around 30-45 . . . are selected [and required] to
participate in an instructional league . . . Again, MLB‘S UPC . . . requires [players] to
perform this work without pay‖) (alterations to original in quoted text) (omissions from
original in quoted text).
35
Id. at 34.
36
Id.
37
Andrew Keh, Chances are Extra Work in Off-Season Involves Baseball, Not a
Second Job, N.Y. TIMES (February 23, 2013) available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/02/24/sports/baseball/for-baseball-players-finding-work-in-off-season-is-nolonger-a-necessity.html?pagewanted=all (―For the fourth straight off-season, McHugh
took a part time office job at Boosterthon Fun Run‖); see also id. (―[Marlon Byrd]
delivered kitchen appliances for a company in Boynton Beach, worked as an attendant at
31
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B. The History of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust
Exemption
MLB has a long history of violating antitrust laws. In fact, MLB has
the ability to simply buy out teams in the league that are not producing
high profits in order to increase revenue. Furthermore, MLB reserves the
right to allow or restrict the introduction of new franchises into the
league, thus driving up the demand for the thirty current franchises.
Franchises are granted super-majority voting requirements by MLB
bylaws that are used to prevent cities that are financially capable of
supporting franchises from joining the league.38 As stated by Gov. Jesse
Ventura:
Imagine for a minute that the American Association of Cell Phone
Manufacturers met in Chicago last week and at the meeting thirty of the
largest manufacturers got together for cocktails to identify which of them
they could buy out and close down in order to reduce the output of their
product and maximize the profitability of the remaining
manufacturers . . . . But, of course, we all know that eventually their
strategy would fail. It would fail because first of all, their conspiracy
would very likely be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and, in an
act of fairness to all entrepreneurial Americans, the government would
remedy the situation . . . . Right. Except for baseball.39
The reason that MLB is able to do this is by using the antitrust
exemption that was granted to it in 1922.40 In Federal Baseball Club v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the court held that
baseball was not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, reasoning that
―[t]he business is giving exhibitions of [baseball], which are purely state
affairs.‖41 The court acknowledged the fact that in order to hold these
―exhibitions,‖ there must be travel across state lines, but that transport
interstate is not the essential thing.42

a golf course in Tarpon Springs and moonlighted as a bouncer at a bar in Clearwater‖)
(emphasis added).
38
Thomas A. Piaino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Professional
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677 (1996).
39
Fairness in Antitrust in Nat‟l Sports (FANS) Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 3288
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 16-17 (2001) (statement of Jesse
Ventura, Governor, State of Minnesota).
40
Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat‘l League of Prof‘ Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209
(1922).
41
Fed. Baseball Club, Inc., 259 U.S. at 208 (alterations to original in quoted text).
42
Id. at 209.
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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ITS ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

A. An Analysis of Why the Exemption Should be Lifted
While professional athletes play their respective sports because they
love them, it is always in the back of their mind that they must perform
well in order to get paid well. It is no different for management: owners,
general managers, and presidents enter into the professional sports
industry because they love sports, but they too are constantly thinking
about money, or how they can return the greatest profits. MLB thinks
like this for one good reason—teams make a lot of money.43 For this
reason alone, there needs to be a change in the laws that govern the
industry. In 1922, when MLB received its antitrust exemption, there
were a limited number of teams and players and few ways for fans to
follow their teams. Today, MLB is an international sports giant,
receiving revenue from television contracts, sponsorships, and a number
of other sources.44 A good example of just how much the game has
changed is the case of Stan Musial. Stan Musial was a Hall of Fame
MLB player in the 1940s and ‗50s;45 however, in the offseason he sold
Christmas trees from a parking lot to make extra money.46 In today‘s
league, future Hall of Famers are making millions of dollars and would
not need to, nor be able to sell, a Christmas tree without protection from
fans looking to take pictures and receive autographs.
Thus, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Federal Baseball Club needs to
be examined.47 MLB is using that ruling to further take advantage of its
players by restricting their access to playing for teams in other states and
forcing them into binding contracts that nullify their negotiating power.
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., a MiLB player, Toolson, was
assigned by his franchise to another franchise and upon his refusal to
43

Maury Brown, MLB Revenues $7.5B for 2012, Could Approach $9B by 2014, BIZ
OF BASEBALL (Dec. 10, 2012) http://www.bizofbaseball.com/?catid=30:mlb-news&id
=5769:mlb-revenues-75b-for-2012-could-approach-9b-by-2014&Itemid=42&option=co
m_content&view=article (―In 2012, revenue for MLB and its thirty teams surpassed $7.5
billion, an increase of 257% since 1995. Annual revenue will continue to climb as new
television contracts begin to perform and is expected to reach $9 billion in 2014‖).
44
MLB International, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/international/mlbi_index.js
p (―[MLB] games are broadcast in 233 countries and territories in 17 different languages.
During the 2013 season, over 74 million fans paid to attend MLB games‖) (alteration to
original in quoted text).
45
Keh, supra note 37.
46
See id. (―[Stan Musial] . . . sold Christmas trees from a parking lot . . . during the
late 1940s, when Musial was a three-time World Series winner and three-time National
League Most Valuable Player.‖) (alteration to original in quoted text) (omission from
original in quoted text).
47
Fed. Baseball Club, supra note 40 at 209.
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play for the new franchise, he was placed on the ineligible list for the
assignee team.48 Furthermore, when he refused to report to the assignee
team, MLB refused to allow him to play professional baseball
altogether.49 Toolson filed a suit under the Sherman Act,50 but to no
avail, as the court claimed that baseball was not held to be commerce or
trade, but simply sport.51
Although Toolson was handed down sixty years ago, the same issues
continue to haunt MiLB players today. There are two interesting points
that arose out of this case. The first arose in Gardella v. Chandler,52 in
which the court mentioned that MLB might be viewed as commerce, as
the radio and television aspects of the game had changed since the times
of telegraphing the game play by play.53 This point is especially
significant as in recent times because not only are games transmitted
over the radio and television, but there are also live streams through the
internet and satellite radio that make the games available to the entire
world. If there were arguments made as early as 1951 for this change, it
is hard to imagine why nothing has been done in the time since.
The second interesting point follows the first closely. The Court of
Appeals has found that it is not its place to disregard a decision made by
the Supreme Court only thirty years prior54 and held that, if the Supreme
Court had made an error in its former opinion, then it was up to the
Supreme Court to correct that error.55 But nearly a century has passed
since that decision was made. For a better perspective, it was only a

48

Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Id.
50
See id. at 93 (Plaintiff filed suit under the Sherman Act, alleging that MLB is a
monopoly and that he had been deprived of his livelihood by his inability to break his
contract).
51
Id. at 94; See also ALBERT THEODORE POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 164
(2003).
The Curt Flood Act amends the Clayton Act to provide that practices
―directly relating to or affecting major league baseball players‖ are
subject to the federal antitrust laws. The Curt Flood Act specifically
excludes from its coverage minor league baseball, the amateur draft,
relations between the major and minor leagues, franchise relocations,
intellectual property, broadcasting rights, and major league umpires,
all of which continue to be exempted from the application of federal
antitrust laws.
52
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
53
Toolson, 101 F. Supp. at 94.
54
Id.
55
Id.
49
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couple years prior to the holding in Federal Baseball Club56 that women
were given the right to vote.57 It is time for a change.
It is vital here to examine the actual language of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (―Act‖) to determine if modern day MLB would in fact be
violating the law without its exemption. Section 1 of the Act provides a
general guideline, stating that any form of contract that places restraints
on interstate or foreign trade is prohibited.58 Hence, when a player is
drafted, he is forced to either sign the UPC or not play professional
baseball,59 and once signing the UPC, he is no longer allowed to sign a
contract to play for any other baseball team in any state or even any
foreign country.60 MLB is also allowed, due to the exemption, to impose
industry-wide salary limits across state lines.61 Furthermore, Section 1 of
the Act forbids conspiracy in restraint of trade.62 Conspiracy is an
agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime63 and MLB
consists of the offices of MLB as well as thirty franchises. This same
argument can be made to show MLB‘s violation of Section 3 of the
Act.64
Section 2 of the Act provides a general rule forbidding monopolies
from being formed.65 MLB‘s rules carefully regulate how and when a
player can enter into the league and how and when they can reach the
higher levels of their respective organization. Additionally, it is in no
way illegal for MLB to become the prosperous industry it is today. MLB
has thus become the one and only profession of its kind in the United
56

Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 209.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
58
See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (―Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . . .‖) (omission
from original in quoted text).
59
Complaint at 28-29, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014).
60
Senne, No. 3:14-cv-00608-JCS at 28-29.
61
Keith Bradsher, Congressmen Pledge to Revoke Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption,
N.Y. TIMES (December 24, 1994) available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/24/s
ports/baseball-congressmen-pledge-to-revoke-baseball-s-antitrust-exemption.html.
62
Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 58.
63
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
64
See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (―Every contract, combination in form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any territory of the
United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between
any such Territory and another . . . is hereby declared illegal . . . .‖) (omissions from
original in quoted text).
65
See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (―Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty . . . .‖) (omissions from original in quoted text).
57
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States, leading to young players having a strong desire to gain entry into
the league. Lastly, Section 7 of the Act provides a remedy to any person
that is injured by any other person or corporation for violating the Act.66
Therefore, without the exemption granted to MLB an argument could be
made that any and all MiLB players could bring suit, arguing that they
have been injured by the strict contract provided by MLB. This analysis
of the Act itself provides a strong argument against the nature of MLB,
as well as the merits of its antitrust exemption.

B. Reasons to Fight for the Antitrust Exemption
On the other hand, an argument can be made that MLB‘s antitrust
exemption is the only thing keeping MiLB running. ―The repeal of
baseball‘s antitrust exemption would affect the incentive that MLB has to
continue its investment in the minor leagues.‖67 Basically, if the
exemption was lifted, there would be the risk that all of the abovementioned rules would be in violation of the Act and thus there would
cause a domino effect. This effect would potentially destroy the
competitive balance of MLB,68 as the franchises that have the most
money would be able to pay higher prices for the top prospects.69 There
would also be ripples affecting the small towns and cities where the
teams are located and would potentially leave many prospects with no
abilities to work their way up to the major leagues.70 Lastly, along with
the lower level prospects, employees within MiLB organizations would
be left without jobs and because of the very small revenue these teams
create, these employees would be unable to afford a legal team to fight
for their own rights.71

66

See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (―Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United
State . . . .‖) (omissions from original in quoted text).
67
Stanley M. Brand and Andrew J. Giorgione, The Effect of Baseball‟s Antitrust
Exemption and Contraction on its Minor League Baseball System: A Case Study of the
Harrisburg Senators, 10 VILL. SPORTS ENT. L.J. 49, 50 (2003).
68
Id. at 51.
69
See id. (―In the event of repeal, the minor league player draft and reserve clause
might be challenged as illegal restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act‖).
70
See id. at 52 (―The effect of eliminating the antitrust exemption would be quite
severe because it would harm communities, careers, and people associated with baseball
at both the major and minor league levels.‖)
71
Brand, supra note 67, at 52 (―Minor League Baseball has virtually no television
revenue, and ticket sales and fence sign advertising do not generate sufficient cash flow
to support a legion of lawyers.‖)
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In 1998, Congress passed legislation that affected MLB‘s antitrust
exemption, but it did not affect MiLB in any way.72 In response, MiLB
made three sound arguments in support of minor league exemption. The
first was that, because the MiLB existed, millions of fans were able to
watch professional baseball, whereas they would otherwise have no other
opportunity to be able do so.73 MiLB also argued that without the support
of MLB, the communities that the MiLB teams were located in would be
unable to support their local teams.74 Lastly, it argued that MLB would
have much less incentive to provide the payment of salaries and other
costs to MiLB players, management, and staff.75
While these arguments seem very strong, MiLB, not MiLB players,
made them. MiLB players potentially hold a lot of power within MLB. If
all 6,000 MiLB players decided to quit or go on strike because of their
working conditions, MLB would likely have to make changes. Without
these players, the talent level in MLB would steadily decline, teams
would struggle to replace retired or injured players, and fans would likely
become weary of paying to watch a less competitive sport. Thus, had
there been a MiLB labor union in 1998, it can be argued that there would
have been more MiLB arguments in favor of change as opposed to the
result that occurred.

III.

HOW MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL‘S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
HAS LED TO LARGER ISSUES

A. The Destruction of a Free Market
MLB‘s antitrust exemption goes further than just exploiting MiLB
players. MLB enjoys the ability to control what is supposed to be a free
market. Because of the exemption, MLB can not only block franchises
from joining the league, but can also block teams from moving their
franchise to a different city. Generally, in professional sports the teams in
72

Stanley M. Brand, The Case for the Minor League Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 14
ANTITRUST 31 (2000).
73
See id. at 32 (―Maintaining the exemption thus serves the public good by increasing
the availability of minor league baseball.‖)
74
See id. (―That purpose is furthered because maintenance of the exemption fosters
Major League Baseball‘s financial support to the minor leagues, without which many
smaller or rural communities could not support professional baseball.‖)
75
See id. (―The subsidy provided to minor league baseball by MLB in the form of
minor league player salaries and other costs, which MLB would have much less incentive
to provide if it could not retain control of minor league players through the minor
leagues‘ six-year reserve clause and player draft is critical to preservation of the minor
leagues.‖)
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large part succeed due to the amount of revenue they are able to generate.
This is because the more money the team produces, the more flexibility it
has to maintain expensive players as well as sign high-level players
through free agency. This is usually due to teams having better records,
bigger fan bases, and being located in larger markets.76 This results in a
severe disadvantage to those teams that do not have these same benefits,
such as the MLB franchise in Oakland.77 To illustrate, around 2010, the
City of San Jose desired to move the Oakland Athletics to their city,
offering a new stadium.78 However, using the shield that is their antitrust
exemption, MLB was able to block this move.
MLB also has the power to allow or to forbid the creation of new
franchises at its discretion. By having this power, the number of teams in
the league is kept to a smaller number than what would exist in a free
market.79 ―The owner‘s refusals to expand their leagues to meet the
demand for additional franchises constitutes exactly the type of conduct
that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.‖80 The reason that MLB
wishes to maintain a low number of franchises is because owners of
franchises are in competition with each other to maintain the high value
of their respective franchises, thus increasing their own worth.81 ―If the
members of a sports league did not compete . . . they would be perfectly
willing to expand the number of franchises . . . .‖82

B. Major League Baseball‟s Violation of Federal Minimum
Wage and Overtime Laws
Although the federal minimum wage law has not changed since
2009, its $7.25 per hour83 minimum is still being violated by MLB in the
76

See Chi. Prof‘l Sports Ltd. P‘ship v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 754 F. Supp. 1336,
1541-42 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (―[T]he richest teams enjoy competitive advantages [such as]
the ability to bid for free agents or to pay to keep their own players . . . .‖) (alteration to
original in quoted text) (omission from original in quoted text).
77
Other small market teams include: The Cleveland Indians, The Kansas City Royals,
The Cincinnati Reds, The Tampa Bay Rays, etc.
78
Justin B. Bryant, Analyzing the Scope of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust
Exemption in Light of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1841 (2014).
79
Thomas A. Piaino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Professional
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677 (1996) (―The owners have successfully conspired
to keep the number of franchises substantially below that which would exist in a free
market.‖)
80
Id. at 1678.
81
See Piaino, supra note 79, at 1689 (― . . . [B]ecause the team owners are in
competition with each other in the market for the sale of franchises, they have an
incentive to limit the number of teams available‖) (alteration to original in quoted text).
82
Id. (omissions from original in quoted text).
83
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2009).
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pay of MiLB players. Using an average player‘s salary of $5,500 per
year84 would mean that a player is making roughly $1.76 per hour during
a championship season and $2.65 per hour in the offseason.85 One reason
for these astonishingly low numbers is that in the last forty years
inflation has risen more than 400 percent, while MiLB salaries have risen
a mere 75 percent.86 The second and equally surprising reason for these
incredibly low numbers is MLB‘s violation of federal overtime pay laws.
The $7.25 minimum wage is based on a forty-hour workweek.87
Although MiLB players work more than forty hours per week, they are
not receiving overtime pay. If that were the case, these numbers would
not seem so skewed. In fact, a court held in 1998 that baseball was not
exempt from federal overtime laws.88 In Bridewell v. The Cincinnati
Reds, the Sixth Circuit held that the Cincinnati Reds were not exempt
from the federal overtime laws because the organization operates year
round with over 100 employees.89 Therefore, the defendant‘s argument
that the organization is a seasonal employer was struck down.90 Although
the plaintiff in Bridewell was a maintenance worker rather than a
baseball player,91 a similar argument can be made that because MLB
requires players to maintain playing condition, participate in spring

84

Complaint at 33, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014) (― . . . [M]ost minor leaguers earn less than
$7,500 per calendar year. Some earn $3,000 or less.‖) (alteration to original in quoted
text).
85
A $5,500 salary divided into fifty-two weeks is roughly $106 per week. A
championship season consists of roughly twenty weeks during which players are working
around sixty hours per week, thus earning an hourly wage of around $1.76. The
remainder of the year is roughly thirty-two weeks during which players are working
around forty hours per week; thus earning an hourly wage of $2.65 per hour.
86
Howard Megdal, The Plight of the Minor League Baseball Wage Slave, VICE
SPORTS (November 4, 2014) https://sports.vice.com/article/the-plight-of-the-minor-league
-baseball-wage-slave (―In other words: When Baltimore Orioles manager Buck
Showalter talks about pocketing just $13,000 for a single season in Sarasota some 30-plus
years ago, he was still earning more than three times in relative purchasing power than
what he would be making today.‖)
87
Fair Labor Standards Act, supra note 83.
88
Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 829 (6th Cir. 1998).
89
Id. at 829.
90
See id. (―We reversed the district court‘s judgment, however, and held that the
proper focus was not on the duration of the baseball season, but on the fact that the Reds
organization operated year-round with no fewer than 120 employees in the ‗off-season‘‖).
91
See id. (― . . . Plaintiffs-Appellees, Robert Bridewell and others, as a part of [The
Reds] maintenance staff at Riverfront Stadium . . . .‖) (alteration to original in quoted
text).
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training, and execute workout packets,92 it follows that they therefore are
not simply seasonal employees.93
So, MLB pays wages that are illegal according to federal minimum
wage laws, violates overtime wage laws, and does not provide payment
for work performed outside of the championship season. However, a
common response to these accusations is that there is a long seven-month
off-season during which players can secure second jobs to support
themselves.94 While this may be true, and while players more often than
not obtain second jobs during the off-season, there are few employers
that will hire someone who can only work for seven months, and the
employers that can, do not pay much more than MiLB.

C. The Ramifications of Major League Baseball‟s Antitrust
Exemption on Minor League Baseball Players
Furthermore, MLB‘s low pay is bad for the public good. As noted,
one of MiLB‘s arguments in 1998 was that it provided a public good by
offering fans the ability to watch professional baseball. However, by
paying players such low salaries and by forcing them to sign a binding
contract for seven years, MLB has taken a young man into adulthood and
thrown him into the world with a lack of education and life experience.
For example: Player A is a nineteen year-old baseball player drafted and
sent to play for MiLB. From that point on, he has seven years to make it
to the major league level. If after those seven years he has not made it,
then it is likely the team will not want to resign him. Rather, they can
simply draft another nineteen year-old that year and try to make it work
out better for the new draftee and the franchise. Now Player A is jobless
at twenty-six years old, has not received any sort of higher education, has
very little if any work experience, and has no money to his name. It is
not overly cynical to think that this player will most likely have
difficulties succeeding in life. Thus, this system is ultimately bad for the
public.

92

Complaint, supra note 84, at 34 (―It is believed that all Franchises direct the winter
work by issuing training packets to all players. Many, and perhaps all, Franchises monitor
workouts and punish players for not performing off-season workouts‖).
93
See Megdal, supra note 86 (alteration to original in quoted text).
If anything, a good case can be made that minor leaguers are more
than full-time employees, at least if they [are] doing their jobs right.
Baseball excellence requires practice and repetition, countless hours
of fielding grounders and grooving one‘s swing, all in addition to
playing actual games. It requires physical conditioning, too, which
means working out and eating well, neither of which is cheap.
94
Keh, supra note 37.
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The age argument is also the perfect response to combat a couple of
claims MLB could raise. The first claim is that if players did not want to
be subject to such harsh conditions they could use their talents to receive
scholarships at colleges and universities and gain an education. The
second claim is that by providing such low salaries, MLB is not
poisoning college baseball by incentivizing young players to forgo
college. However, for the young baseball player, age is everything. For
every year that passes, a player‘s value decreases due to the constantly
growing arsenal of newer, younger players with similar skill levels. It is a
bit easier to think of this from a business standpoint. More often than not,
the owner of a franchise would much rather pay the $1100 first year
price for an eighteen year-old prospect that is almost at the same skill
level as a twenty-two year old college athlete. In those four years, the
franchise will be able to have complete control over the development of
that player, whereas the college athlete will be twenty-six years old by
that point.
MLB constantly uses words like ―development‖ and
―developmental‖ to describe its contracts and systems.95 This creates the
façade that the seven-year exclusivity contract is the exact amount of
time it would take to develop a young athlete into a major league
baseball player. However, it is interesting to note that this contract was
not always for seven years; twenty years ago, it was only six.96 So, it
seems that quite a bit has changed in MLB‘s rules and guidelines, but not
much has changed regarding the violation of wage laws and their
antitrust exemption.

IV.

COMPARING THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION TO MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

MiLB and the NCAA are very similar in that both train and coach
players who may eventually become elite professional players. These
two organizations were formed at a time when sports were not seen as a
business. ―The actual formation of the NCAA dates back to the early95

Complaint, at 30, Aaron Senne v. Office Of The Comm‘r Of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv00608-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed May 16, 2014) (―The MLB . . . uses a vertically integrated
system of development for these minor leaguers. Players begin at the lowest levels of
MLB‘s developmental system, levels known as Rookie and Short-Season A. Ideally they
then advance to higher levels: Class-A, Advanced Class-A, Double- A, and Triple-A . . .
―) (alteration to original in quoted text).
96
See Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 114, 123 (1994) (―If
MLB determines that antitrust laws make it too risky to draft and then reserve players for
six years . . . .‖) (omission from original in quoted text).
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1900s when President Theodore Roosevelt called a meeting to lay
ground rules and regulations for football to ensure the safety of future
players.‖97 At the time, ―[i]t was common for schools to settle debates on
athletic ability purely through . . . [sport] competitions.‖98 Additionally,
MiLB was formed in 1901,99 at a time when professional baseball
players were not the international icons they are today and when the
business of baseball was not producing the type of income it does today.
NCAA institutions make millions of dollars a year by exploiting
their college athletes and hiding behind the idea that it is a fair trade-off
for the education provided.100 The similarities between the exploitation of
these athletes and MiLB players are quite obvious. Both organizations
require countless hours of work by their athletes both in their
championship seasons and in the offseason with little to no
compensation. MiLB uses the dream of making it to the major leagues101
and being paid millions much as the NCAA uses the free education
ostensibly provided to defend the lack of compensation to the athletes.102
However, it can be argued that these players are not on scholarship for
educational purposes, but rather to provide the university with talented
athletes that will increase demand and increase revenue.103 In addition, in
97

Formation of the NCAA: An Unexpected Beginning, NCAA HISTORY GUIDE,
(November 21, 2012 9:00 AM), http://ncaahistoryguide.com/formation-ncaa-unexpectedbeginning/.
98
Id. (alteration to original in quoted text) (emphasis added).
99
The History & Function of Minor League Baseball, The Official Site of Minor
League Baseball (July 8, 2011) http://www.milb.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp.
100
See O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (― . . . [N]one of
these leagues offers the same opportunity to earn a higher education that FBS football
and Division I basketball schools provide‖) (omission from original in quoted text)
(alteration to original in quoted text).
101
Complaint, supra note 95, at 31 (―Given that MLB carefully controls the entryway
into the highest levels of baseball, and given the young minor leaguer‘s strong desire to
enter the industry, MLB and Defendants have exploited minor leaguers . . . .‖) (omission
from original in quoted text).
102
See O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 973 (Dr. Emmert testified that ―the rules over the
hundred-year history of the NCAA around amateurism have focused on, first of all,
making sure that any resources that are provided to a student-athlete are only those that
are focused on his or her getting an education.‖).
103
See Pete Volk, Richard Sherman on the NCAA: „You‟re not on scholarship for
school‟, SB NATION, (Jan. 30, 2015 11:51 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/collegefootball/2015/1/30/7951529/seahawks-richard-sherman-michael-bennett-slam-ncaa
(Richard Sherman on the NCAA: ―No, I do [not] think college athletes are given enough
time to really take advantage of the free education that they [are] given . . . People think,
‗Oh, you [are] on scholarship.‘ They pay for your room and board, they pay for your
education, but to their knowledge, you [are] there to play football. You [are] not on
scholarship for school and it sounds crazy when a student-athlete says that, but those are
the things coaches tell them every day . . . .‘‖) (alteration to original in quoted text)
(omission from original in quoted text).
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both instances the players are the ones that are actually generating the
revenue for the organizations by being the product that produces such
high demand.
The NCAA provides rules that threaten a loss of eligibility in order
to prevent student athletes from being able to negotiate.104 Student
athletes are barred from endorsing any commercial product or service
while they are in school, regardless of whether or not they receive any
compensation in doing so.105 However, these same athletes must provide
their school with their athletic services and acquiesce in the use of their
names, images, and likeness for commercial and promotional
purposes.106
The NCAA‘s extortion of college athletes in order to gain large
revenues is similar to MLB‘s extortion of MiLB players. Players in both
institutions are overworked while receiving minimal remuneration and,
at the same time, are providing the entertainment that the institutions
need to maintain revenue. If MiLB players did not exist, MLB would
lose the funneling of high-level talent to the Major Leagues. This would
likely lead to less demand from fans, because quality of the product
MLB would be putting on the field would decline.
Although the NCAA provision states that players should be
motivated primarily by education, NCAA allows football players to leave
for the National Football League (NFL) draft if they are three years
removed from high school107 and allows basketball players to leave for
the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft after only one year in
college.108 Thus, unless these athletes graduate at an expedited rate, they

104

It is important to note that upon losing amateur status student-athletes are no longer
eligible to play collegiate sports. See id. at 974-75 (―The amateurism provision in the
NCAA‘s current constitution states that student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.‖)
105
See id. (―Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.‖).
106
Id. at 966.
107
Kevin Clark, NFL Draft: College Football‟s NFL Problem, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(March 2, 2014) available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230458
5004579415241023161788 (―Since the late 1980s, the NFL has allowed players who are
three years removed from high school to enter the draft‖).
108
Chris Anderson, Is One-and-Done the Best Policy for College Basketball,
BLEACHER REPORT (April 18, 2012) http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1150413-collegebaksetball-is-one-and-done-the-best-policy-for-college-basketball (―A player shall be
eligible for selection in the first NBA Draft with respect to which he has satisfied all
applicable requirements of section 1(b)(i) below and one of the requirements of Section
1(b)(ii) below: (i) The player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar
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will not be leaving with a degree.109 As a result, if these student-athletes
do not succeed as professionals, they drop into the real world in a similar
situation to that of MiLB players after their seven-year exclusivity
period. Additionally, while college players are supposed to be motivated
by education and MiLB players by the opportunities of the major
leagues, both organizations reap the benefits through jersey sales,
naming rights, gate and media receipts, etc.110

A. Laying the Groundwork for Change
Like MLB, the NCAA can be viewed as an organization that puts
restraints on free trade.111 This has led to antitrust and labor suits similar
to what MLB has dealt with over the years. The difference, recently, is
that there has been forward progress in remedying this potentially illegal
situation in the NCAA. The most recent case concerning the NCAA
involves the payment of student-athletes.112 In O‟Bannon v. NCAA, the
court used a rule of reason test to decide whether plaintiffs can prevail on
a violation of the Sherman Act claim.113 The rule of reason test is a
burden-shifting framework114 and in order to be successful, a plaintiff
year in which the Draft is held, and (B) . . . at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since
the player‘s graduation from high school.‖) (omission from original in quoted text).
109
Id. (―From a university perspective, this is a complete hypocrisy of what a university
is supposed to stand for. Though athletics are surely a huge industry in the college
atmosphere, a university‘s main goal is to ensure the education and advancement of its
own students. These athletes who come in for a year, take minimal credits, and leave the
next are making a complete mockery of the system and taking away scholarship money
from much more deserving students as well as student-athletes‖).
110
Darren Rovell, NCAA President: No Pay for Players on Jersey Sales, CNBC
(December 22, 2011) http://www.cnbc.com/id/45768248# (―[The] Adidas contract with
Michigan is the largest in the country, an eight-year, $66.5 million deal signed in 2007.
After they won the BCS Championship, Alabama signed an eight-year extension with
Nike worth almost $30 million‖) (alteration to original in quoted text).
111
See O‘Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 991 (― . . . [S]chools could alternatively be
characterized as buyers in a market for recruits‘ athletic services and licensing rights. The
relevant market would be that for the recruitment of the highest ranked male high school
football and basketball players each year‖) (omission from original in quoted text)
(alteration to original in quoted text).
112
See id. at 962-63 (―Plaintiffs are a group of current and former college studentathletes. They brought this antitrust class action against the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in 2009 to challenge the association‘s rules restricting
compensation for elite men‘s football and basketball players‖).
113
See id. at 985 (―When ‗restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all,‘ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must
be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.‖) (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010)).
114
See id. (citing from Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063) (alteration to
original in quoted text) (omission of citations in quoted text).
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must show that ―[t]he restraint‘s harm to competition outweighs its
procompetitive effects.‖115
The court found that the initial burden on the plaintiff was met by
holding that FBS football schools and Division I basketball schools
provide a distinct market.116 The court further held that because these
schools are the only suppliers in that market, they are able to fix the price
of their product.117 The burden was then shifted to the NCAA, which
claimed four procompetitive justifications118 that were subsequently
found to be insufficient.119 The first justification provided by the NCAA
was the preservation of amateurism in college sports120; however, the
Court concluded that the restrictions set by the NCAA played a minor
role in the consumer demand for FBS football and Division I
basketball.121 The second justification was the promoting of a
competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball

[T]he ‗plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint
produces ―significant anticompetitive effects‖ within a ―relevant
market.‘‘ If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, ―the defendant
must come forward with evidence of the restraint‘s procompetitive
effects.‖ Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must
―show that ‗any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner.‘‖
115
Id. (quoting from Tanaka) (alteration to original in quoted text).
116
See id. at 987.
117
O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp 3d at 988 (Holding that the Plaintiff met his initial
burden)(―Because FBS football and Division I basketball schools are the only suppliers in
the relevant market, they have the power, when acting in concert through the NCAA and
its conferences, to fix the price of their product. They have chosen to exercise this power
by forming an agreement to charge every recruit the same price for the bundle of
educational and athletic opportunities that they offer: to wit, the recruit‘s athletic services
along with the use of his name, image, and likeness while he is in school. If any school
seeks to lower this fixed price—by offering any recruit a cash rebate, deferred payment,
or other form of direct compensation—that school may be subject to sanctions by the
NCAA‖).
118
See id. at 999 (―(1) the preservation of amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting
competitive balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams; (3) the
integration of academics and athletics; and (4) the ability to generate greater output in the
relevant markets‖).
119
See generally id. at 999-1003.
120
See id. at 999.
121
See id. at 1001 (rejecting the NCAA‘s first procompetitive justification of preserving
amateurism in college sports)(― [T]he NCAA‘s restrictions on student-athlete
compensation play a limited role in driving consumer demand for FBS football and
Division I basketball-related products. Although they might justify a restriction on large
payments to student-athletes while in school, they do not justify the rigid prohibition on
compensating student-athletes, in the present or in the future, with any share of licensing
revenue generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses‖) (alteration to
original in quoted text).
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teams.122 In regards to this, the Court held that the evidence did not show
that a particular level of competitive balance was needed in order to
maximize consumer demand.123 The third justification was the
integration of academics and athletics,124 which the Court found
unpersuasive, claiming that the NCAA cannot use this goal in order to
prohibit any student-athlete compensation.125 The last justification
provided by the NCAA was the ability to generate greater output in the
relevant markets; 126 however, the Court found that this was unsupported
by the record.127 The final step in the test is for the plaintiff to show that
there are alternatives that are less strict, yet as effective.128 However,
while the plaintiff provided alternatives,129 the court found that these
were not necessary as the defendant‘s failed in its obligation under the
122

See id. at 999.
O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 1002 (Rejecting the NCAA‘s second procompetitive
justification)(―Accordingly, the NCAA may not rely on competitive balance here as a
justification for the challenged restraint. Its evidence is not sufficient to show that it must
create a particular level of competitive balance among FBS football and Division I
basketball teams in order to maximize consumer demand for its product. Nor is it
sufficient to show that the challenged restraint actually helps it achieve the optimal level
of competitive balance‖).
124
See id. at 999.
125
See id. at 1003(Rejecting the NCAA‘s third procompetitive justification)(―[T]he
only way in which the challenged rules might facilitate the integration of academics and
athletics is by preventing student-athletes from being cut off from the broader campus
community. Limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help schools
achieve this narrow procompetitive goal. As with the NCAA‘s amateurism justification,
however, the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping prohibition on any
student-athlete compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing revenue generated
from the use of student-athletes‘ names, images, and likenesses.‖) (alteration to original
in quoted text).
126
See id. at 999.
127
See id. at 1004 (Rejecting the NCAA‘s fourth procompetitive justification)(―[T]he
NCAA‘s argument that the current rules enable some schools to participate in Division I
that otherwise could not afford to do so is unsupported by the record. Neither the NCAA
nor its member conferences require high-revenue schools to subsidize the FBS football or
Division I basketball teams at lower-revenue schools‖) (alteration to original in quoted
text).
128
O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 985.
129
See id. at 1005. Court provides the alternatives that the NCAA raised:
[P]laintiffs have identified two legitimate less restrictive alternatives
for achieving these goals. First, the NCAA could permit FBS football
and Division I basketball schools to award stipends to studentathletes up to the full cost of attendance, as that term is defined in the
NCAA‘s bylaws, to make up for any shortfall in its grants-in-aid.
Second, the NCAA could permit its schools to hold in trust limited
and equal shares of its licensing revenue to be distributed to its
student-athletes after they leave college or their eligibility expires.
See id. (omission from original) (alteration to original).
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framework.130 The plaintiff‘s success in this case is going to lead to
substantial changes soon for the NCAA and it may lead to even more
changes in the future.

B. Applying the O‟Bannon Rationale to a Potential Case
Against Major League Baseball
O‟Bannon can be used to examine the potential ramifications of a
lawsuit against MLB. A strong argument can be made that by applying
the same burden-shifting framework from O‟Bannon, MLB may be
unsuccessful in maintaining its antitrust exemption. First, the
hypothetical plaintiff could raise the same argument to show that MLB‘s
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant
market.131 A court would likely hold that the qualitative differences
between MLB and its alternatives provides MLB with a distinct market
because MLB is the only supplier in this market and is able to fix prices
(i.e., the UPC contract that every player drafted is forced to sign).
The burden would then shift to MLB to provide evidence of the
restraint‘s procompetitive effects.132 MLB‘s strongest argument would
likely be that its rules provide a competitive balance amongst all thirty
franchises and that, without it, the wealthiest franchises would simply
outbid the others for the top prospects. However, a court could well find
that the removal of the restrictions forced on draftees by the UPC would
not have any effect on the consumer demand for the product because
most—if not all—franchises‘ fan bases continue to support the teams that
they have been supporting for years, independent of their performance. It
would not be difficult to prove that this is true because, if it were not,
then every year the last place team would be unable to provide the
financial support to continue to be a franchise in the following year.
Even if MLB were able to provide a procompetitive justification,
plaintiffs would likely be able to point to less restrictive alternatives 133
that would yield the same results that MLB has seen throughout the
years. The alternative that is staring MLB in the face is to pay MiLB
players more money. This would provide benefits to both parties as the
players would be able to earn a real livelihood,134 and MLB would not be
130

See id. (―A court need not address the availability of less restrictive alternatives for
achieving a purported procompetitive goal ‗when the defendant fails to meet its own
obligation under the rule of reason burden-shifting procedure.‘‖) (quoting PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1913b (Aspen Pub., 3d ed. 2006)).
131
Id. at 985.
132
O‘Bannon, 7 F.Supp. 3d at 985.
133
Id.
134
Howard Megdal, The Plight of the Minor League Baseball Wage Slave, VICE
SPORTS (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/article/the-plight-of-the-
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risking the potential violation of federal minimum wage and overtime
laws. A court would likely find that running in parallel with this solution
would be the introduction of a strict cap on individual contracts at the
major league level. This would limit the amount of money paid to major
leaguers and would thereby allocate more funds to pay minor league
players more. For example, if the cap were set to $150 million, Giancarlo
Stanton‘s contract would leave open an additional $175 million that
could be used to pay MiLB players more. MLB could even go as far as
setting low-level, mid-level, and high-level caps based on players
performances.
The problem with implementing this alternative however, lies within
baseball‘s collective bargaining agreement between MLB and the MLB
Players Association (―MLBPA‖), which would require the players to
agree to the hard salary cap. However, only one in every six players
drafted (roughly 17.2 percent) make it to the major league level;135 thus,
it does not seem plausible that the MLBPA would agree to lowering
salaries. As such, a second alternative is more realistic. If MLB gave
draftees the ability to negotiate their contract rights, it would eliminate
the exclusivity period and leave MLB free and clear of potential
ramifications of blocking free trade.
These less restrictive alternatives would leave MLB in the same
financial position it currently holds. Additionally, the concerns that
MiLB raised in 1998 would likely not materialize. The fans who are able
to watch professional baseball, and who arguably otherwise would not
have the opportunity, will retain that ability. Lastly, the fear that MiLB
would lose its financial support from MLB, and that MLB would lose its
incentive to continue to support MiLB, would become moot.

minor-league-baseball-wage-slave. Howard Megdal on why MLB should be incentivized
to pay players more money:
If it sounds like major league teams are being penny-wise and poundfoolish by keeping minor league salaries so low—essentially,
starving their own seed corn to save a few bucks—well, there [is]
some truth to that. After all, baseball is made up of 30 teams looking
for absolutely any competitive edge they can find. More and more of
them are aware of the role that nutrition plays in the development and
maintenance of athletic performance. Lawsuits and basic fairness
aside, those teams have every incentive to pay their future major
league workforce well enough to focus on the sport alone.
135

See Matt Eddy, One in Six Picks Will Click on Trek from Draft to Majors, BASEBALL
AMERICA (July 22, 2013) http://www.baseballamerica.com/draft/one-in-six-draft-pickswill-click/ (―Baseball America arrived at that number by analyzing the 22 drafts from
1987 through 2008, noting the number of signed players who reached the big leagues for
at least one game‖).
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW A LABOR UNION
IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL COULD FIGHT FOR CHANGE
AND THE BARRIERS PREVENTING ONE FROM FORMING

―All team sports have unions to represent them in contract
negotiations, arbitration hearings, working conditions and do all the
things unions do for their members—almost all groups, that is. Minor
League baseball players are the lone group of professional athletes not
represented by a players‘ organization.‖136 In 1956, MLB players formed
a union in order to combat MLB‘s rules and restrictions.137 This labor
union has become one of the strongest in the country.138 Unfortunately, it
does not include MiLB players, leaving them vulnerable to every
restriction set by MLB.
The combination of MLB‘s antitrust exemption and the lack of a
labor union have ultimately led to the issues raised here. The simple
solution would be for MiLB players to form a union to protect their
rights; however, there are a number of barriers preventing them from
doing so. These barriers include risk, financial consideration, labor
market weaknesses, and demographics.139
Due to the abundance of young talented baseball players, those who
have been signed to a franchise are generally unwilling to risk losing
their current situation. For this reason, it is hard to expect a young
ballplayer to stick his neck out for not only himself, but also for all other
MiLB players, by lobbying for a union. This is yet another instance of
U.S. labor laws‘ weakness on one-sidedness. The vulnerability of those
who attempt to unionize pervades the entire economy. 140 There is a fear
136

Harold Uhlman, Minor League Baseball—Is Financial Emancipation on the Way?,
THINK BLUE LA (March 15, 2014) http://www.thinkbluela.com/index.php/2014/03/15/m
inor-league-baseball-is-financial-emancipation-on-the-way/.
137
TONY COLLINS, SPORT IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY: A SHORT HISTORY 113 (2013).
138
See Ian Gordon, Minor League Baseball Players Make Poverty-Level Wages,
MOTHER JONES (July/August 2014) http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/baseba
ll-broshuis-minor-league-wage-income (―The Major League Baseball Players Association
is sports‘ strongest union, but it does [not] represent minor leaguers and often signs away
their rights in collective bargaining agreements struck with team owners‖) (alteration to
original).
139
See generally Uhlman, supra note 136.
140
See Lance Compa, Slumming in America, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 5, 2010)
http://prospect.org/article/slumming-america (―The most common violations allowed
under U.S. law are aggressive, one-sided, fear mongering campaigns that employers
launch when workers try to form unions. Managers can haul workers into captive
audience meetings, forbidding any talk-back, to hear ―predictions‖ of workplace closure
if employees form a union, as long as the predictions are not threats. This predictionversus-threat distinction pleases judges and lawyers but leaves workers baffled and
scared‖) (alteration to original).

164 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:139

amongst players that by doing this they will offend their parent team. 141
Both Marvin Miller, the Executive Director of the MLBPA from 1966 to
1982, and Gene Orza, a retired MLBPA attorney, have both spoken to
this problem:
Marvin Miller: ‗The notion that these very young, inexperienced
people were going to defy the owners, when they had stars in their eyes
about making it to the major leagues, it [is] just not going to happen‘ . . .
Gene Orza: ―Young players
are unlikely to make noise while they
[are] trying to get promoted—they do [not]
want to tick off [the
club] by being the person who forms the union.‖142
Additionally, former MiLB player Garrett Broshuis has confirmed
this, stating that ― . . . [e]very single player you talk to, even if they
realize [a union] would be a good thing, is also scared to death to talk to
another player about it.‖143
Financial considerations are also a barrier to the formation of a
union. A major union is unlikely to come to MiLB in an effort to
unionize because the financial rewards for it would be very limited. In
order for the major union to be successful in organizing, it would need to
provide ― . . . [s]taff, office space, attorneys, travel, and other
expenses . . . .‖144 To be able to provide these things, the union would
collect dues; however, because of the lack of finances from MiLB
players the dues would not be sufficient to cover the costs.145 Thus, there
is little incentive for a union to take on this challenge without signs of
greater readiness on the part of the players themselves.146 The final
barrier results from the fact that MiLB teams are spread out across the
country.147 ―The task of organizing a group of employees spread out
across North America is a daunting task, as is servicing those
employees.‖148
Organizers and leaders like Marvin Miller do not appear on the scene
very often. Garrett Broshuis believes that in order for there to be a
141

Id.
See id. (alterations to original); see also Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors,
SLATE (April 3, 2012) http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_
league_union_thousands_of_pro_baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where
_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.html. (―The notion that these very young, inexperienced people
were going to defy the owners, when they had stars in their eyes about making it to the
major leagues—it [is] just not going to happen,‖ Miller says)(alteration to original).
143
Lance Compa, Slumming in America, AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://prospect.org/article/slumming-america (alteration to original in quoted text).
144
Id.
145
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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change there needs to be a bold person to take the helm and lead a drive
for a labor union into MiLB.149 Nevertheless, no one has currently taken
the initiative. Hence, the most plausible solution would be for a MLBPA
to follow the Professional Hockey Players Association‘s precedent by
encompassing its developmental league players. ― . . . [T]he Professional
Hockey Players‘ Association represents approximately 1,600 minor
league players across 64 teams throughout the American Hockey League,
the East Coast Hockey league and the Central Hockey League which are
the premier player development leagues for the National Hockey
League.‖ 150 One would think that, because nearly every MLB player had
to work their way through MiLB in order to achieve their success,
members of the MLBPA would be anxious to include players that are
currently going through the same sort of unfortunate situations that they
had similarly gone through. But this is not the case. MLB players tend to
feel that being in the minor leagues is a rite of passage and that ― . . .
minor league players [should] wait their turn.‖151
The MLBPA even goes as far as to negotiate with MLB regarding
the rights of MiLB players. The 2014 season marked the beginning of a
new collective bargaining agreement negotiated by MLB and the
MLBPA.152 The agreement not only raised the minimum wage for MLB
players to $500,000, but set new limits on bonuses paid to players
drafted.153 So, although the MLBPA does not represent the newly drafted
players, it retains the right to negotiate their bonuses.154 The hypocrisy in
this is that MLB players, as members of the MLBPA, are negotiating to
keep salaries and bonuses for MiLB players low, when they themselves
went through the same process. But such is the business of baseball. As
sports economist James Lambrinos states, ―Collective bargaining does
[not] just pit owners against employees, sometimes it pits employees
against other employees.‖155 In light of the fact that the average MLB
149

See Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (April 3, 2012)
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_league_union_thousands_
of_pro_baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.h
tml (― . . . [U]nless some underpaid minor leaguer takes it upon himself to become the
Cesar Chavez of baseball‖) (omission from original) (alteration to original).
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THINK BLUE LA, (March 15, 2014) http://www.thinkbluela.com/index.php/2014/0
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151
DON WOLLET, GETTING ON BASE: UNIONISM IN BASEBALL 105 (2008) (alteration to
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George Gmelch, Minor League Pay: Baseball‟s Antitrust Exemption Allows for
Poverty Wages, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, (July 16, 2014), available at
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player has spent four to six years in the minors,156 a greater level of
solidarity should be expected.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the professional sports world has changed since the
day baseball was granted an antitrust exemption. It is clear that MLB is
no longer simply about the sport, it is about business. However, on the
inside, MLB continues to use precedent set nearly 100 years ago to
violate rights and laws and abuse its employees. The league was given an
iron shield to protect itself from the Sherman Antitrust regime that
governs every other industry in the country. Something needs to be done,
especially in regards to the exploitative labor relations that characterize
MiLB. However, there does not seem to be a light at the end of the
tunnel. In order for there to be change, one of three things must happen:
(1) Congress would need to strike down MLB‘s antitrust exemption, (2)
a bold MiLB player, backed by a national union, must rally other players
into the formation of a union, or (3) the MLBPA must either include all
professional baseball players or at least fight for MiLB player rights.
Until then, the monopolized industry of baseball will continue to grow in
wealth at the expense of its employees.

http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26155052/minor-league-pay-baseballsantitrust-exemption-allows-poverty).
156
Based on the average age of position players in MLB being 24.4 years old; see Ben
Lindbergh, Overthinking It Promoting Prospects, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 22, 2011)
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=13018
From 2005-2009, the average player making his major-league debut
was 24.4 years old (taking the average of their seasonal ages). The
average position player had 2070 minor-league plate appearances
under his belt before he first stepped in against a major-league hurler;
the average pitcher (without distinguishing between starters and
relievers) had thrown 391 minor-league frames before getting his first
crack at The Show.

